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Social capital is important in many business relationships, the agricultural sector 
especially. With almost 40% of the farmland in the United States leased from someone else, 
these relationships are an integral part of many farming operations. In this paper, social capital 
can be thought of as the idea that a person’s relationships can impact economic outcomes. The 
goal of this study is to find the impact of social capital on farmland leasing relationships in 
Kansas, using data from a survey sent to both producers and landowners.  
The survey was sent to members of the Kansas Farm Management Association (KFMA) 
in late January 2018, with the receiving period ending in mid-May 2018.  The survey provided 
data on the rental rate of farmland, characteristics of the lease, the land and the relationship 
between the producer and landowner. Utilizing a snowball method, a second survey was given to 
the producer to send to their landowner with the intention of collecting a database of matched 
pairs. An OLS regression was used to analyze producer data to determine the impact of producer 
characteristics, landowner characteristics and land characteristics on cash rental rates.  
Various factors such as lease length, a family relationship, land productivity, how the 
landowner obtained the land and the location of the land were thought to impact the rental rate 
paid to the landowner in a cash rent lease. However, results estimate that doubling the length of 
lease may result in a 9% discount on the rental rate as compared to market value and that if the 
landowner inherited the land there could be up to a 20% discount on the rental rate as compared 
to market value. As well as the fact that productivity of the land has a positive effect on rental 
rate, meaning more productive land will cost more to rent. This supports the hypothesis that 
longer leasing relationships, those with higher social capital, have a negative impact on rental 
rate paid to the landowner. It disproves the hypothesis that when land changes hands from one 
  
landowner to the next, the previous social capital is lost, instead it appears that the relationships 
continue unaffected. 
These results present an opportunity to better prepare landowners and producers for 
conversations about farmland leasing. For producers who rely on leased land, being aware of 
current relationships and their value is important, as well as knowing how to have conversations 
about estate planning. For beginning farmers, this information can be used as a building block, in 
place of monetary capital they may not have. Being able to form strong relationships with the 
people around them can prove to have value in the future. The results show that social capital has 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Relationships are important in many business ventures, the agricultural sector especially. 
Almost forty percent of farmland in the United States is rented or leased from someone else 
(USDA NASS, 2015). In Kansas, this means for some tenants and landlords to make a living, a 
lease agreement must be in place – this agreement is likely the result of some level of 
relationship, or social capital. Social capital can have a variety of definitions because of the 
various disciplines that find the idea relevant (Neira, Vázquez, and Portela, 2009). Robison, 
Myers, and Siles (1999) defined social capital as “a person or group’s sympathy or sense of 
obligation for another person or group”. Based on that definition, the social capital between a 
tenant and landlord has the opportunity to influence major pieces of their agreement, including 
the rental rate.  
The purpose of this research is to build off Taylor and Featherstone (2018) to further 
examine the effects and value of social capital in farmland leasing relationships and answer 
questions regarding the subject. Specifically, does a long-term and/or close relationship affect the 
cash rental rate at which land is leased (Taylor and Featherstone, 2018)? Furthermore, are there 
other identifiable factors in a tenant landlord agreement that affect the rental rate, beyond the 
relationship itself? In order to answer these questions, characteristics of leasing relationships are 
identified and analyzed. Similar studies used to help shape this research have focused on 
landlord and tenant satisfaction with the relationship, contract choice and valuing farmland rental 
contracts. 
The data used for this analysis are the results from a survey sent to members of the 
Kansas Farm Management Association (KFMA) in January of 2018. The survey was sent to 
tenants and their landowners and asked questions about land the tenants own and land they rent. 
Information about their lease, conservation preferences and demographic information was also 
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gathered. Summary statistics indicate that the average rental rate is $65.41 per acre of cropland, 
with the average lease relationship spanning over 16 years.  
An ordinary least squares regression is used to identify which characteristics most affect 
the rental rate. The results show that both lease length and how the landlord acquired the land are 
significant factors in leasing relationships, as well as land productivity and where the land is 
located. An increase in the lease length by 100% results in a 9% discount on rental rate as 
compared to the market rate and if the landlord inherited the land there can be roughly a 15% 
discount on rental rate versus the market rate. Productivity of the land influences rental rate in 
the opposite direction, accounting for up to a 40% higher rental rate, however that is intuitive 
because more productive land is expected to have a higher rental rate.  
By identifying and analyzing these characteristics that impact rental rate, tenants and 
landlords alike can be better prepared to make informed decisions when it comes to negotiating 







Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
Social capital is an integral part of many business relationships, farmland leases especially. 
The often-informal nature of these farmland lease contracts means that the strength of 
relationship between the two parties can be the difference between the lease agreement taking 
place or not. While research has been done about social capital from an economic standpoint, as 
well as in the agricultural economics literature, the idea that this social capital can impact these 
farmland leases is less researched. This chapter will explore articles, studies and other research 
that focus on defining social capital, the importance of rented land, landlord – tenant 
relationships and previous studies that have looked at social capital. Upon reviewing the 
literature, it can be seen that there are lapses in the literature, and an opportunity for this research 
to fill those gaps.   
 2.1 What is Social Capital? 
Social capital can have various definitions, and as stated before social capital, or 
relationships are the foundation on which most farmland leases take place.  When looking at 
business relationships, social capital can be defined as “the potential benefits, advantages, and 
preferential treatments resulting from one person or group’s sympathy and sense of obligation 
toward another person or group” (Neira, Vázquez, and Portela, 2009). As defined by Nan Lin in 
his book, Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Auction, “the principle behind social 
capital is simple: investment in social relations with expected returns in the marketplace” (Lin, 
2001). Lin suggests that this can be true of almost any type of market whether economic, 
political or even a community. Individuals put effort into interacting with one another in order to 
gain something, in some cases profits, in other cases, savings. This can be translated to the 
farmland leasing relationships when lengthy and/or stronger relationships emerge between 
tenants and landlords. In short, social capital can best be described by Robison, Myers and Siles 
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(1999) as “a person or group’s sympathy or sense of obligation for another person or group” 
(Robison et al., 1999). 
Paul Wilson (2000) stated that social capital, similar to other economic assets, requires 
input or investment. With this investment comes the opportunity for the economic value, and for 
that value to fluctuate. Social capital may depreciate if not sustained or it may flourish if certain 
relationships are maintained (Wilson, 2000). Meaning, if a relationship between a producer and a 
landlord is well maintained, there are potential benefits for both. For example, a flat rental rate 
for the producer or the peace of mind for the landlord to know their land is being cared for 
properly is mutually beneficial for both parties.  
 2.2 Importance of Rented Land 
According the USDA NASS’s 2014 TOTAL (Tenure, Ownership, and Transition of 
Agricultural Land) Survey more than 2 million landowners rented out 353.8 million acres of land 
for agricultural purposes in the U.S. An overwhelming majority of those landowners (87%) were 
landlords who do not operate a farm (USDA NASS, 2015). In Kansas alone, 23.7 million acres 
were rented out in 2014, the largest in the Plains region of Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, South Dakota and Texas (USDA NASS, 2015). This signals the importance of rented 
land to many farming operations, especially here in Kansas.   
The TOTAL Survey asked landowners about their plan for the land in the next five years 
- if the land would be transferring hands, and if so, through what method. Options included 
selling the land to a relative, selling to a non-relative, putting it in a trust, putting it in a will and 
other options (USDA NASS, 2015). The results showed that operator landlords, those who also 
operate their own farm, expected to transfer 15 percent of their land in the next five years. While 
non-operator landlords also expect to transfer 14 percent of the land they currently rent out in the 
next five years. The acreage expected to transfer is about 10 percent of all land used for 
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agriculture, or around 91.5 million acres (USDA NASS, 2015).  It is also worth noting that the 
five year period of transfer would be happening this year, in 2019, making this research a 
valuable resource for those on the receiving end of the land or tenants who will see their landlord 
change. 
Young and beginning farmers are particularly impacted by land leasing because of their 
reliance on rented ground when they are just starting their farming operations. Katchova and 
Ahearn (2014) use data from three agricultural censuses (1997, 2002, and 2007) to show just 
how important rented acres are to beginning and young farmers. They separate out those two 
groups – using “young” as an age descriptor, someone who is less than 35 years old and using 
“beginning” to describe those who have 10 years or fewer of farming experience. The 
assumption is that beginning farms tend to be smaller and more reliant on rented land. While 
Katchova and Ahearn (2014) found that young farmers tend to use farmland leasing as a method 
of entry into farming. This puts further emphasis on the importance of social capital not only for 
established farmers, but also those who are younger or just beginning and rely heavily on rented 
ground (Katchova and Ahearn, 2014). 
 2.3 Current Landlord – Tenant Relationships  
While rented land is important for beginning and young farmers, established farmers and 
landlords rely on the relationships they have already built. An indicator of a successful 
relationship is an open line of communication. This can be especially important for non-farming 
landlords or those who may be a generation, or more, removed from the farm. These 
conversations can be about the crops and livestock being grown on the land, improvements and 
maintenance needed on the property and opinions on conservation practices. The idea is that the 
landowner and tenant have a two-way relationship not simply one where the tenant puts a rent 
check in the mail with the Christmas card every year. Instead, it is encouraged that the tenant 
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gets to know the landowner on a personal level; meet for coffee, send school pictures of the kids 
or even pictures of young livestock or crops being planted and harvested. Landlords are much 
more willing to work with a tenant when they need rent decreased or a fence mended if they 
know that the tenant has been taking care of their land while leasing it (Taylor, 2019 – Extension 
meetings). 
Other strategies being communicated to tenants include having a written lease, providing 
the landlord with a resume of your farming operation and providing cost information as well as 
other general information on agriculture as needed. For landlords, they are encouraged to have a 
written lease, not hesitating to ask questions, scheduling yearly meetings and remembering to be 
rational – whether it be about the current market rental rate or a potential tenant. While not all of 
these apply to every relationship, the written lease for instance, it is good to know what other 
tenants and landlords are doing and be on the lookout for new practices that could strengthen the 
relationship. (The Ohio State University, 2001) 
The goal is for the tenant and landlord relationship to look more like a friendship or a 
mutually beneficial agreement rather than just a business transaction.  
 2.4 Previous Work on Leasing Relationships 
There are a few notable papers that have studied portions of this project. Paulson and 
Schnitkey (2013) looked at farmland markets and rental valuation; Bryan, Deaton, and Weersink 
(2015) conducted a landlord-tenant relationship survey in Ontario, Canada; and Rainey, Dixon, 
Parsch, Ahrendsen, and Bierlen (2003) researched the value of landlord perceptions in a 
relationship study. Taylor and Featherstone (2018) have also done a study of the value of social 
capital using KFMA data, with this current research being built off their model.   
The rental valuation, or rent paid to the landlord, is often determined by the perceived 
productivity of the land. In their work on farmland rental markets, Paulson and Schnitkey (2013) 
7 
 
found that rental rates may not always adjust to reflect the annual changes in that productivity. 
The land could be worth more or less, depending on the crop being grown and the market for 
said crop in any given year. With some lease agreements being multi-year contacts, an 
adjustment to account for these changes cannot be made and instead tenants and landlords rely 
on negotiations that may have taken place years prior (Paulson and Schnitkey, 2013). This may 
lead to rental rates being higher or lower than the market rate at any given point in the contract.  
Rainey et al. (2003) studied landlord satisfaction levels in farmland leasing using a 
sample of Arkansas landowners. This work revisits a previous study performed using Arkansas 
tenants by Bierlen and Parsch in 1996 that studied their lease satisfaction. The results from the 
tenant survey showed that lease type had little influence on tenant satisfaction but instead factors 
such as lease length, tenant dependence on agriculture for income, education, yield variability 
and kinship to landlord were important (Rainey et al., 2003). 
The Rainey et al. (2003) study then asked the landlords questions on leasing behavior, 
background information on the tenant and their relationship as well as the length and terms of the 
leasing agreement. There were also questions about the perception of the tenant’s managerial 
ability. The variables used to estimate lease satisfaction in the landlord study were similar to 
those in the tenant survey and include variables such as type of lease, age of landlord, quality of 
land, social closeness (relatedness), lease length, and number of acres leased. The results of the 
landlord study show that the variable indicating social closeness or relatedness, or how close the 
relationship is between the two parties, supports the idea that the closer the relationship the more 
likely the landlord is to be satisfied with the lease. This, along with the results from the tenant 
survey confirm the importance of a social capital related variable in lease satisfaction (Rainey et 
al., 2003). It should be noted, that both the 1996 study and current study found positive 
coefficients for length of lease and relationship, with length of lease being significant. 
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A unique aspect of the Rainey et al. (2003) paper is the mention of an “ideal sample” that 
includes data from both the landlord and tenant perspectives for a given parcel. This is adopted 
in this research, as the use of a snowball method of sampling allows for the gathering of 
information from both parties (Rainey et al., 2003). 
Bryan et al. (2015) conducted a study in Ontario, Canada that involved nonfarmer 
landlords and whose aim was to provide an understanding of whether the landlord-tenant 
relationships impacted rental contract choice and/or the value of cash rent. They separated 
variables into four categories – social capital, landlord characteristics, tenant characteristics and 
land or market characteristics. Social capital was defined using two variables, a binary family 
relationship variable and a length of time variable. The family variable was chosen as a proxy for 
trust, assuming that family members involved in a rental contract share a relatively higher level 
of trust. The length of time variable, in years, was used to show experience between the landlord 
and tenant. Length of time was also used to represent trust and thus a higher level of social 
capital (Bryan et al., 2015). Their results showed no statistically significant relationship between 
rental rate and family relationship or length of lease. They maintain that social capital is 
reciprocal, in short, there is no reason to expect the landlord to give the tenant a reduced rate. 
They also found no statistically significant relationship between length of relationship and choice 
of contract. They did find that family members are less likely to cash rent, and this was 
statistically significant.  
Taylor and Featherstone (2018) used data from a 2015 survey of Kansas farmers to 
determine the role social capital plays in farmland leasing relationships. The farmers were asked 
about their leasing relationships, the design of the land leases and characteristics of their 
landlord. The conceptual framework of their paper states that landowners face certain monitoring 
costs when working with any tenant, but this can fluctuate depending on the amount of social 
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capital, or trust, between the two. There are also potential search costs of finding a new tenant 
should the current one proves to be unfit. The idea is that the landowner will make certain 
tradeoffs when it comes to the rent they receive, given the monitoring costs (affected by where 
they live, their mobility, agricultural knowledge, etc.) and the search costs associated with 
finding a new tenant. Taylor and Featherstone’s hypothesis was as social capital, measured by 
length of leasing relationship, increases, the rental rate paid by the current tenant will decrease 
(Taylor and Featherstone, 2018). Their conceptual model is explained in the next chapter as it is 
the basis for this research.  
Taylor and Featherstone used multiple variables including the productivity of the land, 
lease length, a binary variable showing if the landowner and tenant are related, a binary variable 
showing if the landowner lives in the same county as their land and number of crop acres in the 
lease. The data were from a 2015 survey of Kansas Farm Management Association (KFMA) 
members.  The average cash rent was $64.71 per acre and the average lease length was 16.1 
years. Almost one third of the landowners were related to the tenants. The results from the study 
showed that for every 100 percent increase in length of leasing relationship (in years) there was a 
10 percent decrease in the rental rate paid versus market value. At the average rental rate paid, 
$64.71 per acre, that results in a $6.47 per acre discount. This statistically significant finding 
confirms the importance of social capital to rented agricultural land in Kansas. According to the 
USDA, there is strong potential for land to change hands in the coming years. It is important that 
both established and beginning farmers realize the significance of strong relationships with their 
landowners, as well as the next generation that may own the land (Taylor and Featherstone, 
2018).   




Chapter 3 - Conceptual Model 
 The decision of which tenant to choose can be complex for a landowner. In some cases, 
there may be multiple tenants to choose from, all with varying motives. There are two types of 
lease that are most popular: fixed cash and crop share. A fixed cash lease allows for an exchange 
of a fixed dollar amount per acre, typically for a single growing season. This can create an issue 
for the landowner as that fixed amount is not based on profitability or production, rather it just 
gives the tenant access to the ground. However, with this type of lease, there is a possibility the 
tenant will not take good care of the land, as they only intend to farm it for a short period of time. 
There is opportunity for the tenant to overuse the nutrients in the soil and not replenish them 
because they do not own the ground or do not intend to use it in the next growing season. There 
is also opportunity for the tenants to neglect other features of the land, such as fences or terraces, 
and fail to ensure they are in the same condition as when they first gained access.  
For the landowner, this creates a problem of monitoring costs. Landowners who live 
close to the land may have the chance to check up or keep tabs on their tenants, but those living 
further away, outside the county or even the state, may encounter issues. These costs are 
monitoring costs and can be said to be non-zero for the landowner. This is regardless of where 
they reside and will likely be higher the further away the landowner lives (Taylor and 
Featherstone, 2018). 
The conceptual framework for a landowner’s choice in tenant can best be explained by 
using a utility maximization model. This comes from Taylor and Featherstone’s (2018) paper on 
the value of social capital.  
max𝑈 = 𝑈(𝑟, 𝑙(𝑚))     (1) 
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Where r is the market rental rate for cropland, l is the long run, intrinsic productivity of 
the cropland and m is the cost of monitoring a tenant’s behavior in terms of long run value of the 
cropland, such as soil nutrients and other characteristics.  
The landowner can maximize utility by trading a higher rental rate against monitoring 
costs to preserve the long run value of the land. There is the chance that the tenant will offer a 
very high cash rent but overuse the land and deplete the nutrients because they only intend to 
farm the cropland for a single growing season.  
This is where social capital may be useful, an alternative to monitoring cost is a level of 
social capital or trust between the tenant and landowner. This is represented by s and is typically 
the result of a relationship built over time. The sign of the social capital coefficient is positive for 
the current tenant as the landowner has had the opportunity to see how they manage and take 
care of the land over the years. The presence of social capital allows the monitoring costs to 
decrease for the current tenant. The equation can be seen below: 
,-
,./
	< 0          (2) 
where m is the monitoring costs and 𝑠4 is the social capital of tenant a, the current tenant. An 
alternative to reduce monitoring costs is to search for a new tenant (b), one that would require 
less monitoring time and effort because they already have a proven record of land preservation.  
This proven record, along with other forms of reference from previous landlords can be 
used in place of social capital and results in Equation 1 being rewritten as follows: 
            max𝑈 = 𝑈	 5𝑟, 𝑙6𝑚(𝑠, 𝑛)89     (3) 
where n is the search costs associated with finding a new tenant.  
To decrease monitoring costs in this equation though, a higher level of search cost is required: 
,-
,:;
< 0            (4) 
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where 𝑛< is the search cost for the new tenant, b. The current tenant, a, has positive social capital 
as they have a relationship with the landowner, and the search costs are assumed to be zero 
because they are already in an agreement. For the potential tenant, b, the social capital is 
assumed to be low because there is no existing relationship or trust and the search costs are 
thought to be positive as the landowner will use time and effort to find and select a new tenant.  
The landowner’s choice can be made by analyzing two key points, the returns to their 
land, r and the monitoring costs, m. Under the assumption that monitoring costs are equal to the 
search costs plus social capital, the landowner will likely choose the tenant that maximizes the 
returns on their land R, as follows: 
𝑅4 = 𝑟 − [𝑠4 + 𝑛4] ≥ 	𝑅< = 𝑟 − [𝑠< + 𝑛<].  (5) 
The returns to the landowner for either tenant are simply a function of rental rate paid 
minus the monitoring costs. The current tenant will be chosen if the social capital they possess is 
less than or equal to the projected cost of searching for, vetting and selecting a new tenant. The 
existence of positive search costs for a new tenant may allow the current tenant to pay below 
market rate and continue leasing the land. 
In simple terms, Taylor and Featherstone’s study, as well as this study, look at the value 
of the social capital variable and how strongly it effects the tenant’s ability to pay below market 








Chapter 4 - Survey Methods and Data Collection 
This chapter will focus on the survey methods used to collect the data needed to 
determine the effect of social capital on farmland leasing relationships. In order to collect this 
information a paper survey was used. The sample consisted of Kansas farmers who were Kansas 
Farm Management Association (KFMA) members and the respective landowner of their largest 
lease.  
 4.1 Survey Creation 
The survey was designed by Dr. Mykel Taylor (Kansas State University), Dr. Leah Palm-
Forster (University of Delaware) and Dr. Simanti Banerjee (University of Nebraska – Lincoln). 
Each survey was approximately 16 pages long and asked questions about Farmland Owned, 
Farmland Leased, Choice Experiment of Lease Scenarios, and Demographic Information in four 
separate sections. 
From the review of the literature, there were certain questions that researchers knew 
would be important such as length of lease, the type of relationship the landowner and tenant had 
(family, friend, business only, etc.), landowner gender, distance from the rented ground, contract 
type and quality or productivity of the ground. Demographic questions including highest level of 
education, marital status and proportion of household income earned through farming were 
included. Other questions about risk preferences, opinions on conservation and other farm 
management practices were also asked in hopes of learning more about the relationship shared 
between landowners and tenant. 
The survey was split into four sections, with the sections about farmland leased (B) and 
the demographic information (D) being used most heavily in analysis. Sections B and D of the 
tenant survey can be found in Appendix A.  
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Photos of the survey packets can be found in Appendix B. Each return envelope had a 
number on it so that each survey could be identified by version letter and number. There were 
166 surveys of version A – E and 165 surveys of version F – L.  
 
 4.2 Selection of Respondents 
The Kansas Farm Management Association (KFMA) works with farmers and their 
families by providing access to economists that work cooperatively with the families to disperse 
production and financial management information for use in decision making. This information 
can come in many forms, for example: on-farm visits, financial benchmarking comparing 
performance with similar size farms, year-end tax planning and guidance for business entity and 
structure planning. Because of the wide variety of offerings, KFMA is able to reach almost 2,000 
producers in Kansas. Using the KFMA member list, surveys were sent to producers who were 
then asked to forward a second survey on to the landowner of their largest lease.  
 
 4.3 Method of Dispersion 
Snowball sampling is a convenience mechanism that involves collecting a sample from a 
population in which a standard sampling approach is not possible or is unreasonable from a 
financial standpoint (Handcock and Gile, 2011). Snowball sampling can help researcher find a 
group of people who may otherwise not be reachable directly by the researcher. With the goal of 
surveying leasing information on both sides of the relationship, KFMA producers and their 
landlords were needed. Producers were sent a packet that included a survey, a return envelope 
and one dollar, as well as a second prepared packet that included a landowner survey, a return 
envelope and one dollar. The producers were asked to send the landowner packet to the landlord 





The purpose of this snowball method was to have matched pair surveys from the 
producer and landlord perspectives on farmland leased and operated, conservation practices and 
rental agreement details. This would allow for an analysis of the impact of the relationship. This 
was mentioned by Rainey et al. (2003) in their paper, calling a sample of both landlord and 
tenant results an “ideal sample”. While there were not enough matched pairs (tenant and 
matching landlord) returned that selected cash lease as their contract type to be useful in this 
research, this proved to be doable and in further research could be tried again.  
An initial contact letter was sent in early January 2018, letting KFMA members know 
that a survey would be sent to them shortly. The surveys were sent out in late January of 2018. 
Approximately 1,985 survey packets were sent during a one week period. With responses 
coming in from the first week of February until mid-May. A reminder letter and postcard were 
sent to members who had not sent back a survey in mid-April that asked them to send back 
surveys if they had them and asked if they would like a new survey sent to them. There were 74 
responses from the postcards, with 43 of them requesting a new survey and the remainder 
choosing not to participate. Response collection concluded mid-May and surveys were then 
double entered by Kansas State Department of Agricultural Economics graduate students using 
Figure 4.1: Survey Dispersion Diagram 
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an online tool created to mimic a virtual version of the survey. The data were entered into an 
Excel database and then cleaned in three phases. Initial cleaning took place by the creator of the 
online tool, checking for simple errors such as misspelled county names or missing responses. 
Further cleaning was performed to eliminate data entry error and inaccurate responses. In some 
cases, responses were checked against the paper surveys to be sure unusual responses were 
accurate.  
 
 4.4 Response Rate and Selected Variables 
In total, 518 producer surveys and 405 landowner surveys were returned for a response 
rate of 26% for producers and 20% for landowners. The variable definitions for selected 
variables can be found in Table 4.1. The dependent variable is the cash rental rate. Selected 
independent variables are split into four categories similar to the Bryan et al. (2015) study that 
found social capital, tenant characteristics, landlord characteristics and land, or market, 
characteristics influence the cash rental rate. Social capital includes a relationship variable, 
specifically if the landowner and tenant are family, how long the landowner has been leasing to 
the tenant and the number of acres in that lease. Landlord characteristics include if the landlord is 
a retired farmer, if the landowner inherited the land (versus purchasing it), if the landowner is a 
female (as identified by the producer) and if the landowner lives locally, defined as on the farm 
or in the same county. The tenant characteristic included is the tenant’s years of farming. Land 
characteristics that inherently influence rental rate include productivity of the land and a fixed 






Table 4.1 Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
 
CashRent 1 if a rental contract is cash rent 
RentalRate $ per acre 
lnRent Natural log of RentalRate 
  
Social Capital (R)  
FamilyRel 1 if tenant considers landlord family 
FriendAcquaint 1 if tenant considers the landlord a friend or an acquaintance 
NeighborRel 1 if tenant considers the landlord a neighbor 
BusinessRel 1 if the tenant considers the relationship with the landlord business only 
LeaseLength Number of years land has been rented 
LeaseAcreage Number of acres in the largest lease 
lnAcres Natural log of LeaseAcreage 
lnLeaseLength Natural log of LeaseLength 
  
Landlord Char. (L)  
LO_RetiredFarmer 1 if yes, landlord is a retired farmer – tenant’s perspective 
Inherit 1 if yes, landlord inherited the land – tenant’s perspective 
LO_Female 1 if yes, landlord is a female – tenant’s perspective  
LO_Local 1 if yes, landlord lives on the farm or in the same county – tenant’s perspective 
  
Tenant Char. (T)  
YearsFarming Producer’s years of farming experience  
lnYearsFarming Natural log of YearsFarming 
  
Land Char. (M)  
Productivity  Average of Corn, Soybean and Wheat Yields/County Average Yields 
lnProductivity Natural log of Productivity 
NW National Agricultural Statistics Service – Agricultural Statistics District (ASD) - 10 
WC National Agricultural Statistics Service – Agricultural Statistics District (ASD) - 20 
SW National Agricultural Statistics Service – Agricultural Statistics District (ASD) - 30 
NC National Agricultural Statistics Service – Agricultural Statistics District (ASD) - 40 
C National Agricultural Statistics Service – Agricultural Statistics District (ASD) - 50 
SC National Agricultural Statistics Service – Agricultural Statistics District (ASD) - 60 
NE National Agricultural Statistics Service – Agricultural Statistics District (ASD) - 70 
EC National Agricultural Statistics Service – Agricultural Statistics District (ASD) - 80 





Figure 4.2: Survey Response Map 
 
Using a mapping software, a color-coded map of tenant survey responses was created 
(https://mapchart.net/usa-counties.html). Figure 4.2 serves as a visual representation of where in 
the state the responses came from. Surveys were sent to 102 of the 105 counties in Kansas, with 
Stanton, Stevens and Seward not surveyed. Nineteen counties had zero surveys returned, those 
are shown in dark grey on the map above. Over 60% of counties had between one and four 
responses and 10% had ten or more responses. Dickinson County had the most responses with 16 







Chapter 5 - Model Development and Data 
This chapter presents summary statistics, explanation of the variables chosen, and the 
empirical model used to analyze the survey data. The survey responses were analyzed using an 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with the selected variables defined in Chapter 4. Two 
different models were estimated using the full set of producer data, one with the Inherit variable 
and one without the Inherit variable.  
 5.1 Use of OLS Regression and Multiple Models  
As seen in the literature certain variables are thought to influence rental rate paid. These 
can include lease length and family relationships, but others may play a role as well. An ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression model was used to measure how closely the variables chosen are 
to those that actually impact the rental rate paid.  Two models were estimated, the first empirical 
model is below: 
 	𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽G𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑅𝑒𝑙 +
𝛽L𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡+𝛽R𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑙+𝛽X𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑙 + 𝛽Z𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠 +
𝛽[𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ + 𝛽]𝐿𝑂_`abc`de4c-`c + 𝛽f𝐿𝑂e`-4g` + 𝛽h𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 +
𝛽Gj𝐿𝑂_𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽GG𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽GL𝑁𝑊 + 𝛽GR𝑊𝐶 + 𝛽GX𝑆𝑊 + 𝛽GZ𝑁𝐶 +
𝛽G[𝑆𝐶 + 𝛽G]𝑁𝐸 + 𝛽Gf𝐸𝐶 + 𝛽Gh𝑆𝐸  
 
(1) 
In the second model, the Inherit variable is left out. The idea is that when farmland 
changes hands, the previous relationships and social capital that has been built is then lost and 
the new landowner and tenant must rebuild that relationship. In the second model, Inherit is 
added to the regression to test this hypothesis. The second model can be found below:  
 	𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽G𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑅𝑒𝑙 +
𝛽L𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡+𝛽R𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑙+𝛽X𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑙 + 𝛽Z𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠 +
𝛽[𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ + 𝛽]𝐿𝑂_`abc`de4c-`c + 𝛽f𝐿𝑂e`-4g` + 𝛽h𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 +
𝛽Gj𝐿𝑂rst4g + 𝛽GG𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽GL𝑁𝑊 + 𝛽GR𝑊𝐶 + 𝛽GX𝑆𝑊 + 𝛽GZ𝑁𝐶 +




5.2 Data and Summary Statistics 
The dependent variable is the cash rental rate. CashRent is a binary variable indicating 
that the lease type is cash rent. RentalRate is the dollar per acre price paid by the tenant to the 
landowner and lnRent is the natural log of RentalRate in order to make interpretation post-
regression more straightforward. The use of log-log regression coefficient estimates allows the 
coefficients to be interpreted as elasticities. 
There are six social capital variables: (1) a binary family relationship variable named 
FamilyRel, (2) a binary variable indicating a friend or acquaintance relationship named 
FriendAcquaint, (3) a binary variable indicating if the tenant and landowner were neighbors 
named NeighborRel, (4) a binary relationship indicating if the relationship is business only 
named BusinessRel, (5) a variable indicating the number of years the land has been leased from 
the landowner to the current tenant named LeaseLength and (6) LeaseAcres indicating the 
number of acres leased from the landowner to the tenant. Both LeaseLength and LeaseAcres 
were estimated as the natural log.  
There are four landlord characteristic variables: (1) LO_RetiredFarmer a binary variable 
stating the landlord is a retired farmer from the tenant’s perspective, (2) Inherit a binary variable 
if the landowner inherited their land, versus purchasing it, (3) LO_Female a binary variable for if 
the landowner is a female and (4) LO_Local which is a binary variable for if at least one 
landowner the producer works with lives on the farm or in the same county as the rented land. 
There is one tenant characteristic variable: (1) YearsFarming indicating the producer’s years of 
farming experience. YearsFarming was estimated as the natural log.  
Finally, there are land characteristic variables: (1) Productivity, a weighted average of the 
corn, soybean and wheat yields for the farm divided by the county average yields from USDA 
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NASS and (2) fixed effect variables for each USDA NASS geographical region to account for 
differences in location, soil type, rainfall, elevation, etc.  
To interpret the results for binary variables, the coefficients were transformed according 
to Feathertsone et al. (1993) that states that when the dependent variable is logged, a 
transformation must occur. This transformation is: gj =exp(cj) – 1, where cj is the estimated 
coefficient. 
The summary statistics for the selected producer data set, which consisted of 101 
observations, can be found below in Table 5.1. Summary statistics not included in the selected 
variable set include the average producer being almost 58 years old with the average landowner 
age being 72 years old. Only cash rent leases were used in the analysis because they were the 
only ones that provided a rental rate paid to the landowner. However, for the complete producer 
data set, crop share was the lease type selected most often at 60%, with 35% being cash rent and 
the remaining 5% being flex leases. Figure 5.1 below shows the percentage of cash rent leases 
across the state, as compared to the total leases for that county. This serves as a visual 
representation of the fact that crop shares tend to be more prevalent in most counties in Kansas. 








Figure 5.1 Percent of Cash Rent Leases Compared to All Leases 
 
 
The table below shows that the average cash rental rate is $65.41 an acre but that can 
vary across the state, and by crop type and land type (irrigated vs. non-irrigated), it can be as low 
as $20 and as high as $250 per acre. The average number of acres rented in the producer’s largest 
lease was 441 acres. The average relationship lasted a little over 16 years and is not unexpected 
given the theory that most tenants and landowners stay in relationships for long periods of time. 
This is further seen with the longest lease spanning 50 years. When asked about what type of 
relationship the tenant had with the landowner, 44% said there was a family relationship, 40% 
said they were friends or acquaintances, 21% said they were neighbors and 14% said the 
relationship was business only – it should be noted that respondents were allowed to check all 
the relationships that apply. Producers said that 46% of their landowners are retired farmers and 
almost 28% of the landowners are female. It can also be seen that 57% of the landowners are 
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thought to have inherited at least part, if not all, of the land they lease out. Producers said that 
86% of their landowners live locally meaning on the farm or in the same county as the land.  
On average, the tenants have 36 years of farming experience with some having close to 
double that, the maximum being 66 years. The average productivity rating was 106% with 100% 
meaning that the tenant met the county average for yields on soybeans, wheat and corn. The 
Central, South Central, East Central and South East districts had the most observations with 60 




















Table 5.1 Summary Statistics for Producer Data with Cash Leases 
Variable Mean   Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
 
RentalRate 65.419 33.090 20 250 
lnRent 4.084 0.418 2.995 5.521 
Social Capital (R)     
FamilyRel 0.445 0.498 0 1 
FriendAcquaint 0.406 0.493 0 1 
NeighborRel 0.210 0.409 0 1 
BusinessRel 0.140 0.349 0 1 
LeaseLength 16.031 11.434 1 50 
LeaseAcreage 441.611 407.677 18 2160 
lnAcres 5.708 0.906 2.890 7.677 
lnLeaseLength 2.451 0.900 0 3.912 
Landlord Char. (L)     
LO_RetiredFarmer 0.460 0.500 0 1 
Inherit 0.570 0.496 0 1 
LO_Female 0.289 0.455 0 1 
LO_Local 0.867 0.340 0 1 
Tenant Char. (T)     
YearsFarming 36.148 14.909 3 66 
lnYearsFarming 3.457 0.588 1.098 4.189 
Land Char. (M)     
Productivity  1.064 0.312 0.127 1.820 
lnProductivity 0.003 0.393 -2.061 0.599 
NW 0.085 0.281 0 1 
WC 0.015 0.124 0 1 
SW 0.039 0.194 0 1 
NC 0.101 0.303 0 1 
C 0.171 0.378 0 1 
SC 0.132 0.340 0 1 
NE 0.125 0.332 0 1 
EC 0.148 0.356 0 1 




Chapter 6 - Results and Discussion 
The complete results from the analysis can be found in tables 6.1 and 6.2. Highlighted 
below are statistically significant findings that show the value of social capital on rental rate. As 
a reminder, the coefficients for binary variables were transformed, as they cannot be interpreted 
as elasticities without this change (Featherstone et al., 1993). 
In the first analysis, the length of the lease is found to be statistically significant with a 
9% discount on the rental rate as compared to market value for every 100% increase in lease 
length. This could mean a relationship that has successfully lasted from year one to year two or 
one that has existed from 5 years to 10 years. At the average rental rate of $65.41 an acre, the 
discount amounts to $5.88 per acre. For a 100 acre lease, this could amount to a savings of 
almost $600, a sum that could especially benefit a young or beginning farmer. 
In the second analysis, a variable to indicate whether or not the landowner inherited the 
land is included. The hypothesis is that when a new landowner inherits land, the previous 
relationship and social capital is lost, and the tenant must begin the relationship again. This land 
could be passed to a child or grandchild or could simply change hands to a brother or sister of the 
previous landowner. It is seen that if the landowner inherited the land there is an 15% discount 
on the rental rate as compared to market value. This was statistically significant, however when 
Inherit is included, LeaseLength is no longer statistically significant at the 95% confidence 
interval, indicating that the length of the lease and the discount associated with the relationship is 
already being accounted for in the Inherit variable. This 15% discount amounts to $9.81 per acre 
and again using a 100 acre lease, this leads to a very sizable savings of almost $1000. This, 
combined with the fact that the average acreage for these leases was 441 acres, indicates both 
discounts could prove to be key components for successful farmers, young and old.  
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In both analyses the variable Production is also found to be statistically significant and 
positive, as expected, because the rental rate on farmland is often a function of profitability. 
Better land is going to bring a higher rental rate, in this case, up to 40% percent above market 
value can be expected.  
The other variables included, while not statistically significant, may still impact rental 
rate. A family relationship may be thought to be another form of social capital, whether it is a 
son or daughter renting ground from their parents or a brother or sister renting from one of their 
siblings. There is the idea that this relationship holds some value. This variable was placed into 
the social capital category and is found to be negative, indicating a discount but at a very small 
value. Other relationships such as friend, acquaintance, neighbor or business only were also 
thought to have value, however they all proved to have positive, indicating they would result in a 
higher rental rate if present. These results were not statistically significant in either regression. 
There was also indication that if the landlord was a retired farmer or female, they may provide 
discounts to the tenant, again they were not statistically significant, but do seem to be 
possibilities for discounts.  
Certain agricultural districts were found to have statistically significant differences as 
compared to the Central district that was removed to control for collinearity. Those two districts 
were the Southwest district with a significant 75% lower rental rate as compared to the Central 
district and the Northeast district which was found to have a 55% higher rental rate as compared 
to the Central district. While this doesn’t match exactly to what is reported in the most updated 
rental rate research for Kansas, the same concept holds that the Northeast district has the highest 





Table 6.1 OLS Regression One with Producer Data 




lnLeaseLength -0.090* 0.044  0.048 - 
FamilyRel -0.050 0.111  0.652 -0.048 
FriendAcquaint  0.011 0.096  0.903  0.011 
NeighborRel  0.061 0.096  0.523  0.062 
BusinessRel  0.061 0.129  0.635  0.062 
lnAcres  0.048 0.045  0.289 - 
      
P_RetiredFarmer -0.003 0.070  0.959 -0.002 
Inherit -            -  - - 
LO_Female -0.001 0.074  0.981  0.000 
LO_Local  0.050 0.108  0.646  0.051 
     
lnYearsFarming  0.007 0.064  0.913 - 
     
lnProductivity  0.404* 0.089  0.000 - 
NW  0.058 0.138  0.674 - 
WC  0.167 0.245  0.498 - 
SW -0.771* 0.204  0.000 - 
NC  0.077 0.137  0.577 - 
SC -0.161 0.128  0.210 - 
NE  0.598* 0.115  0.000 - 
EC  0.025 0.106  0.814 - 
SE -0.064 0.108  0.555 - 
Intercept  3.930* 0.365  0.000 - 
Dependent Variable: 
ln(Rent) 
    
Observations: 101  R2 = 0.5658   
Note: * represents significance at the 95 percent confidence interval 
28 
 
Table 6.2 OLS Regression Two including Inherit with Producer Data 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error P-Value 
  
Transformation 
lnLeaseLength -0.071 0.044  0.113 - 
FamilyRel -0.055 0.108  0.610 -0.053 
FriendAcquaint  0.011 0.093  0.903  0.011 
NeighborRel  0.082 0.094  0.381  0.085 
BusinessRel  0.070  0.125  0.576  0.072 
lnAcres  0.028 0.044  0.531 - 
      
P_RetiredFarmer -0.051 0.071  0.475 -0.049 
Inherit -0.163*           0.070  0.023 -0.150 
LO_Female  -0.018 0.072  0.803 -0.017 
LO_Local  0.051 0.105  0.629  0.052 
     
lnYearsFarming -0.008 0.062  0.892 - 
     
lnProductivity 0.379* 0.087  0.000 - 
NW   0.074   0.135     0.581 - 
WC   0.238   0.241     0.326 - 
SW  -0.744*   0.199     0.000 - 
NC   0.085   0.134     0.524 - 
SC  -0.140   0.125     0.264 - 
NE   0.546*   0.114     0.000 - 
EC   -0.009   0.104     0.927 - 
SE  -0.077   0.105     0.467 - 
Intercept   4.179*   0.371     0.000 - 
Dependent Variable: 
ln(Rent) 
    
Observations: 101  R2 = 0.5930   




Chapter 7 - Conclusions 
Relationships are important in many industries. The agricultural industry is especially 
reliant on relationships because of the nature of the work. Farmers rely on people who sell seed, 
fertilizer and farm equipment, as well as extension agents and soil scientists to provide helpful 
information. Farmers also form relationships with those who they rent or buy land from. All of 
these relationships produce social capital. Social capital has a variety of definitions but can 
simply be described as “a person or group’s sympathy or sense of obligation for another person 
or group” (Robison et al., 1999).  
This study set out to identify and quantify the effects of social capital in farmland leasing 
relationships. More specifically, does a long-term leasing relationship or a close relationship with 
a landlord influence the rental rate paid by the tenant? Additionally, are there other 
characteristics of the relationship between tenants and landlords that impact the rental rate paid 
such as if the landlord is male or female, retired farmer or not or the tenant’s farming 
experience?  
To collect data for this analysis a survey of KFMA members was performed in January 
2018. The survey was sent to tenants and they were asked to send a second survey onto the 
landowner of their largest lease. The survey asked questions about land the tenants own and land 
they lease, as well as demographic information. The landowner survey asked for complementing 
information. The data was analyzed using two OLS regression models. 
The results from the first model showed that doubling lease length, for example going 
from a one year relationship to two or from five years to ten, resulted in a 9% discount on rental 
rate as compared to market value. A second model showed that if the landlord inherited the land, 
versus buying it there was almost a 15% discount on rental rate as compared to market value. 
Productivity of the land also proved to be a driving factor in rental rate, but that is not 
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uncommon as the idea is that the rental rate itself is derived from the expected productivity of the 
land. If history shows the land to be productive, the landowner should be able to market it as 
such and thus charge a higher rental rate. There were also fixed effects relating to the location of 
the land. NASS agricultural statistic districts were used to account for changes in soil types, 
elevation, rainfall and other characteristics specific to where the land was located.  
 These findings are important for a few reasons. First, the hypothesis that a longer leasing 
relationship results in higher social capital and a lower rental rate is confirmed. The relationships 
that farmers build in year one are just as important as maintaining those relationships in year 
fifteen. These relationships translate into social capital and eventually potential savings. The 
second hypothesis, that when farmland changes hands by passing on to the next generation i.e. 
inherited, not sold, the previous social capital is lost, is found to not be true. It is seen that when a 
new landowner inherits land, the relationship built by the first landowner and the tenant is carried 
over to the new landowner and the discount may actually increase. This could be because the 
new landowner has little knowledge of the farm or are a generation or further removed from the 
farm and simply keeps the same agreement in place. Alternatively, it could be because they did 
not purchase the land, so there is less incentive to charge the market rate because they don’t have 
to make payments to the bank, they already own the land outright. 
 The findings also present a unique opportunity to better educate farmers and landowners 
in current leasing relationships and to prepare them to build relationships in the future. Farmers 
that currently depend on leased land need to be aware of the value of social capital and what it 
means for their current business strategies, as well as being aware of what happens when the land 
they currently lease changes hands. Knowing how to have successful conversations and a plan in 
place is important and should be emphasized by extension agents and other outreach materials. It 
is also important for young and beginning farmers to understand how social capital can be 
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utilized when they are lacking other forms of capital. Investing in strong relationships with 
landowners can be the first step into a successful farming venture and can prove to be of value 
for many years. The relationships formed by tenants both young and old can turn into longer 
leasing relationships and being selected for leases not because they can produce the highest bid, 
but because they take care of the land and have rapport with the landowner.  
 Finally, it should be noted that there were limitations to this research, first, the goal of 
using a matched pair data set was unable to be achieved, as not enough respondents from the 
matched pair group use a cash lease. This resulted in only using producer data, which included 
using the producer’s perspective for variables such as if the landowner is a retired farmer, if they 
are female, how they obtained the land and if they are local. Another limitation is that only 
producers and landowners in Kansas were surveyed. The relationships between tenant and 
landowner in Kansas may differ as compared to other states, this is proven by the fact that the 
results of this study were different than those of the Bryan et al. (2015) study performed in 
Ontario, Canada. In future research, more emphasis should be placed on obtaining the matched 
pair data set, using the snowball method it proved to be doable, and in the future should be tried 
again. This would allow for landlord characteristics to come directly from the landlord, as well 
as confirm the responses of both the tenant and landlord for a single parcel of land.  
 In conclusion, relationships do matter in farmland leasing and in some cases maintaining 
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